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Henry v. British Columbia: Still
Seeking a Just Approach to Damages
for Wrongful Conviction
Dr. Emma Cunliffe*

I. INTRODUCTION
Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General) was the first case in
which a claimant sought damages under section 24(1) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms for breaches of rights that led to a
wrongful conviction and imprisonment.1 In its 2015 decision, the Supreme
Court of Canada clarified the criteria for the award and quantum of such
damages.2 In June 2016, Hinkson C.J.S.C. awarded $8,086,691.80 in
damages to Ivan Henry in compensation, special damages and “to serve
both the vindication and deterrence functions of s. 24(1) of the Charter”.3
This award reflected Hinkson C.J.S.C.’s findings that: Crown Counsel
intentionally withheld relevant information from Henry in breach of his
Charter rights; the wrongful non-disclosure seriously infringed Henry’s
Charter rights; and if Henry had received the disclosure “the likely result
would have been his acquittal at his 1983 trial, and certainly the avoidance
of his sentencing as a dangerous offender.”4

*
Associate Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia
<cunliffe@law.ubc.ca>. I wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Mark Iyengar, Peter A.
Allard School of Law, UBC. His work was funded by the Social Science and Humanities Research
Council of Canada. I also wish to express appreciation to Debra Parkes, Benjamin Berger and Lisa
Kerr, who supplied helpful feedback on earlier versions of this article.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 24, 2015 SCC 24
(S.C.C.), revg [2014] B.C.J. No. 71 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Henry v. British Columbia”].
3
Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2016] B.C.J. No. 1160, 2016 BCSC
1038, at para. 473 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Henry 2016 BCSC”].
4
Id., at para. 472.
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In this article, I describe the events that led to Ivan Henry’s civil case
against British Columbia, and explain the interlocutory decisions that
shaped the passage of that civil case. I attend particularly to two difficult
issues: the role of demonstrable factual innocence in a trial for Charter
damages; and the challenges of affording constitutional rights to sexual
assault complainants in a civil case that arises from wrongful conviction.
Ultimately, I suggest that the Henry case illustrates the inadequacies in
the Canadian approach to post-conviction review and compensation for
wrongful convictions. In lieu of the adversarial process adopted in
Henry, inquiries such as the one conducted by Justice Peter Cory in the
Sophonow case offer a model that holds greater potential for doing justice
to those whose lives and rights may be affected by a wrongful conviction.

II. R. V. HENRY AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS
Ivan Henry was arrested on July 29, 1982. Initially charged with
17 sexual offences, he was tried and convicted of 10 counts in respect of
eight complainants. On November 24, 1983, he was declared a dangerous
offender and sentenced to indefinite detention.5 Henry represented himself
at trial, cross-examining the seven complainants who testified, offering his
own testimony, and calling witnesses. Prior to trial, he repeatedly sought —
and was denied — disclosure of information including complainant
statements and forensic evidence.6 The trial judge described Henry’s work
in court as follows:
Throughout all the proceedings in this Court, Henry refused any legal
assistance and defended himself. No one suggested he was unfit to
stand trial before the jury. Nonetheless, during that trial and during the
dangerous offender proceedings he exhibited peculiar behaviour in the
way he conducted his defence. Repeated suggestions by me that he
obtain legal advice went unheeded.7

5
R. v. Henry, [1983] B.C.J. No. 375 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Henry 1983”]. Henry
remained in prison until June 12, 2009.
6
Henry 2016 BCSC, supra, note 3, at paras. 156-180. On two occasions prior to Henry’s
conviction, judges denied applications by Henry for further disclosure. Chief Justice Hinkson held
that these judicial decisions did not provide Crown Counsel with judicial imprimatur for his
decisions to withhold disclosure. Id., at paras. 238-244. In Henry v. British Columbia, Moldaver J.
held that no liability for Charter damages would arise if a court rules that information sought by the
defence need not be disclosed. Supra, note 2, at para. 91.
7
Henry 1983, supra, note 5, at para. 3.
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Although Henry was treated by the Canadian legal system as fit to
stand trial, the psychiatric evidence presented on sentencing suggested
that Henry suffered from psychosis and thought disorders, and that he
was paranoid.8 In 2009, granting an application to re-open Henry’s
appeal from conviction, Saunders J.A. observed that “Mr. Henry’s fitness
at trial … may bear upon the fairness of the trial.”9 In 2016, Hinkson
C.J.S.C. held on the basis of expert evidence that “Mr. Henry was
mentally destabilized at the time he was making important decisions
about trial matters, including legal representation.”10 Characterizing
Henry as “falling within the thin skull category” of plaintiffs, Hinkson
C.J.S.C. held that he “should not be made to bear the consequences of his
conduct once it is established that he was wrongfully injured”.11
Henry maintained his innocence from the time he was first
interviewed by police12 and throughout his trial. While Henry’s case is
now understood as having turned on the reliability of identification
evidence, the trial judge characterized Henry’s “main defence” as the
proposition that the charged offences had not occurred.13 Henry also
testified that he had never participated in a police line-up viewed by
six of the complainants.14 He tendered into evidence the notorious
photograph of himself handcuffed among a group of smiling foils, in
which he was being restrained in a headlock by one uniformed officer
and was flanked by two others. Henry suggested that the photograph had
been doctored. In his instructions to the jury, Bouck J. stated: “Henry
wanted you to draw the inference that any identification of him is a farce,

8

Id., at para. 16.
R. v. Henry, [2009] B.C.J. No. 46, 2009 BCCA 12, at para. 19 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter
“Henry 2009 BCCA”]. See also R. v. Henry, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2072, 2010 BCCA 462, at para. 33
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Henry 2010 BCCA”]; Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General),
[2015] B.C.J. No. 3087, 2015 BCSC 2319, at paras. 69, 83 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Henry v. British
Columbia, Fourth Amended Notice of Civil Claim”].
10
Henry 2016 BCSC, supra, note 3, at para. 71.
11
Id., at para. 292. See also para. 69, id., citing Janiak v. Ippolito, [1985] S.C.J. No. 5,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 146, at 159, (S.C.C.).
12
Joan McEwen, Innocence on Trial: The Framing of Ivan Henry (Victoria, B.C.: Heritage
House Publishing, 2014), at 22-28 [hereinafter “McEwen”]. Further information regarding the
investigation is supplied in Henry 2016 BCSC, supra, note 3, at paras. 3-12.
13
Id., at 108. In 2009, the BC Court of Appeal stated that “[i]dentification was virtually the
only issue” at trial: Henry 2009 BCCA, supra, note 9. By 2010, the Court characterized the case as
one in which the “only issue … was the identity of the offender”: Henry 2010 BCCA, supra, note 9,
at para. 1.
14
Henry 2010 BCCA, supra, note 9, at para. 61; McEwen, id., at 72.
9
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since he’s the only one being restrained by three police officers.”15
Crown counsel argued in turn that Henry’s refusal to participate in the
line-up could be taken as evidence of his consciousness of guilt.16
Henry immediately appealed both his conviction and sentence. The
British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed those appeals for want of
prosecution in 1984, and an application for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada was also dismissed.17 Throughout his time in
prison, Henry continued to seek avenues for review of his convictions
and/or the exercise of the prerogative of mercy — the Supreme Court of
Canada reported that he filed more than 50 applications between 1984
and 2005.18 He sought, and was denied, leave to apply to the Supreme
Court of Canada on at least four further occasions.19
In 2002, the Vancouver Police Department began to re-investigate
25 sexual assaults that had been committed between April 1983 and July
1988. Henry was in prison when these assaults were committed.20 Police
eventually relied on DNA evidence to link three of these sexual assaults
to a Vancouver man who was subsequently named as Donald McCrae.21
The degree of similarity between the modus operandi used by McCrae
and that attributed to Henry has been variously reported by judges. In
2009, Newbury J.A. identified that eight of the sexual assaults committed
after Henry’s incarceration “involved a similar modus operendi [sic] to
that used by the perpetrator of the assaults for which Mr. Henry was
convicted, and took place in the same Vancouver neighbourhoods.”22

15
McEwen, id., at 108-109. The British Columbia Court of Appeal characterized this
instruction as “a faint presentation of a strong point for the defence, namely, that the pre-trial
identification process was flawed and seriously called into question the reliability of all other
identification evidence.” Henry 2010 BCCA, id., at para. 69.
16
The British Columbia Court of Appeal held that this argument, and Bouck J.’s instruction
regarding consciousness of guilt, were wrong in law. Henry 2010 BCCA, id., at paras. 40-69, citing
R. v. Marcoux, [1976] S.C.J. No. 54, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 763, 60 D.L.R. (3d) 119 (S.C.C.), affg [1973]
O.J. No. 2104 (Ont. C.A.).
17
R. v. Henry, [1983] B.C.J. No. 2204 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Henry, [1984] S.C.C.A. No. 262,
55 N.R. 157 (S.C.C.).
18
Supra, note 2, at para. 15. A partial list of these applications is supplied in Henry 2016
BCSC, supra, note 3, at paras. 26-34.
19
R. v. Henry, [1990] S.C.C.A. No. 334 (S.C.C.); R. v. Henry, [1991] S.C.C.A. No. 205
(S.C.C.); R. v. Henry, [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 77 (S.C.C.); Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney
General), [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 152 (S.C.C.).
20
Henry 2010 BCCA, supra, note 9, at para. 25.
21
R. v. Henry, [2009] B.C.J. No. 337, 2009 BCCA 86 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Henry, [2012]
B.C.J. No. 1932, 2012 BCCA 374 (B.C.C.A.).
22
R. v. Henry, [2009] B.C.J. No. 337, 2009 BCCA 86, at para. 2 (B.C.C.A.).
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In 2010, a three-member panel of the British Columbia Court of Appeal
reheard more extensive arguments made by Henry and the Crown in
respect of whether the offences attributed to McCrae, or the 25 post-arrest
offences as a whole, exhibited such distinctive similarities to those
attributed to Henry that they must have been committed by the same
person. Justice Low concluded on behalf of the panel:
In addition, in considering similarities it is also necessary to take
dissimilarities into account. There is at least one dissimilar circumstance
here that would be potentially significant to a trial judge ruling on
admissibility or to the trier of fact if the evidence were admitted. Four
of the complainants at the appellant’s trial testified that the assailant
used the term “ripped off” and a fifth said that the intruder told her that
a woman named Valerie had taken money from his boss. This specific
ruse does not appear in the particulars of the [25 post-Henry arrest]
Smallman offences.
.....
In my opinion, it cannot be said that the Smallman evidence, whether
viewed in broad focus or in narrow focus by being confined to the
known conduct of D.M., leads one to conclude that the appellant is
innocent of the offences for which he was convicted. It does not
exonerate him. At best, it is evidence that might be admitted at a new
trial under the law relating to other suspects, not on the basis that it
disproves the element of identity, but on the basis that it is capable of
raising a reasonable doubt on that issue. 23

While unable to conclude that the evidence exonerated Henry, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal reversed his convictions, entered acquittals on
each count, and set aside the dangerous offender designation.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal’s 2010 decision identifies
numerous errors and inadequacies in Henry’s trial.24 The Court held that
the verdict on each count was not one that a properly instructed jury
acting judicially could have rendered. In particular, the evidence put
before the British Columbia Court of Appeal suggested that the “Crown’s
case on the element of identification rests entirely on the in-court
identification made by the complainants at the preliminary hearing and at
trial. Pre-court identification was fraught with problems”.25 Expanding
on this observation, the Court held:
23
24
25

Henry 2010 BCCA, supra, note 9, at paras. 149, 151.
These inadequacies are summarized, id., at para. 154.
Id., at para. 109.

148

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Eyewitness identification of a stranger is inherently frail for the reasons
given in the cases. Pre-court identification of the appellant by the
complainants in the present case ranged from tentative to non-existent.
One complainant did not participate in pre-court identification exercise.
The photographic line-up was fatally unfair. The physical line-up
should not have been conducted at all because, to use the description
given in Marcoux, it became a farce.26

Accordingly, Henry’s convictions were quashed and a verdict of acquittal
was entered on each count.
In June 2011, Henry filed a civil suit against British Columbia, the
City of Vancouver, several named police officers and the AttorneyGeneral of Canada. This claim sought damages from each defendant in
respect of its role in the criminal investigation, trial, or post-conviction.
In late 2015, Henry reached confidential settlements with Vancouver
(incorporating the named police officers) and the Attorney-General of
Canada. These settlement agreements were reached in the middle of
Henry’s civil trial, after the plaintiff had closed his case and partway
through Vancouver’s anticipated evidence.27 Consequently, the only
claim that remained before Hinkson C.J.S.C. in the British Columbia
Supreme Court was Henry’s claim against British Columbia.
Henry’s claim against the province focused on the conduct of Crown
counsel before, during and after Henry’s trial, and particularly on the
failure to disclose investigative material including some complainant
statements, information about material collected from the crime scenes,
and forensic evidence. It raised the novel question of when and according
to what criteria Charter damages should be awarded for a breach of the
prosecutorial duty to make disclosure to a criminal defendant. Before this
claim was heard on its merits, it was the subject of an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada. In Henry v. British Columbia,28 the Supreme
Court of Canada set out the test for Charter damages arising from an
alleged failure on the part of the Crown to make disclosure in a criminal
proceeding. Having clarified the test, the Supreme Court of Canada
remitted the case to the British Columbia Supreme Court for trial.
26

Id., at para. 139.
One trial complainant was scheduled to testify on the morning that Henry’s settlement
with Vancouver was announced. In light of the settlement, her testimony did not proceed. Ian
Mulgrew, “Woman who ID’d Henry to testify; J.F.” Vancouver Sun (November 16, 2015), at A3;
Ian Mulgrew, “City settles with Ivan Henry for wrongful conviction; Ottawa and the province ask
for adjournment” Vancouver Sun (November 17, 2015), at A1.
28
Supra, note 2.
27
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III. HENRY V. BRITISH COLUMBIA (ATTORNEY GENERAL)
In Henry v. British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified
the circumstances in which Charter damages should be awarded for a
Crown prosecutor’s failure to make disclosure to a criminal defendant.29
Justice Moldaver held on behalf of a majority that:
… a cause of action will lie where the Crown, in breach of its
constitutional obligations, causes harm to the accused by intentionally
withholding information when it knows, or would reasonably be
expected to know, that the information is material to the defence and
that the failure to disclose will likely impinge on the accused’s ability
to make full answer and defence.30

Justice Moldaver set out four elements that must be proven by a claimant
at trial: that the prosecutor intentionally withheld information;31 the
prosecutor knew or ought reasonably to have known that the information
was material and that failure to disclose would likely impinge on full
answer and defence; the withholding breached the claimant’s Charter
rights; and that the claimant suffered harm as a result of the withholding.32
In order to recover Charter damages, it is not necessary for the claimant
to prove that the failure to disclose caused a wrongful conviction, or that
the claimant is factually innocent. However, Moldaver J. also suggested
that evidence of factual innocence may go to quantum:
… a claimant must prove that, as a result of the wrongful nondisclosure, he or she suffered a legally cognizable harm. Liability
attaches to the Crown only upon a finding of “but-for” causation.
In cases involving wrongful convictions, this “but-for” test avoids the
thorny issue of whether or not factual innocence is required — that is,
proof that the accused did not in fact commit the crimes alleged.
Instead, the focus of the inquiry is on the proceedings that occurred at
the time of the intentional failure to disclose. That said, without
deciding the issue, I would not foreclose the possibility that evidence of
factual innocence or guilt could go to the quantum of damages. 33

29

Id.
Id., at para. 31.
31
This element will be satisfied upon proof that the prosecutor was in possession of the
information and failed to disclose it, or upon proof that the prosecutor was put on notice of the
existence of the information and failed to obtain possession of it, in contravention of disclosure obligations.
Id., at para. 86.
32
Id., at para. 85.
33
Id., at para. 95.
30
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Chief Justice McLachlin and Karakatsanis J. would have adopted a more
lenient standard than that which was set out by Moldaver J. for the
majority. They held that a claim for Charter damages for wrongful nondisclosure should be assessed according to the four-part test originally set
out in Vancouver (City) v. Ward.34 That is, an applicant must establish a
Charter breach by the state and must show that damages would serve at
least one of the functions of compensation, vindication or deterrence.
Upon proof of these two criteria, the onus shifts to the state to show that
Charter damages would be inappropriate or unjust in light of countervailing
considerations. Finally, if the state’s burden is not discharged, the Court
should consider the proper quantum of damages.35 Chief Justice
McLachlin and Karakatsanis J. agreed that a showing of causation was
necessary to the recovery of compensatory damages. However, they
expressed doubt about whether the “but-for” test set out by Moldaver J.
established the appropriate standard.36

IV. CHARTER DAMAGES AND COMPENSATION FOR
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: THE “THORNY ISSUE” OF
FACTUAL INNOCENCE
The difficulties Henry experienced when seeking review of his
conviction — and the course of his civil claim for damages — illustrate
the gaps that persist in the Canadian approach to post-conviction review
and compensation.37 Before the Supreme Court of Canada, Henry argued
that the Court should recognize a broad and generous entitlement to
Charter damages:
… a claim for Charter damages for non-disclosure resulting in his
wrongful conviction and imprisonment predicated on … simple Charter
34

[2010] S.C.J. No. 27, 2010 SCC 27 (S.C.C.), varg [2009] B.C.J. No. 91 (B.C.C.A.).
Supra, note 2, at para. 107.
36
Id., at para. 118.
37
See generally, Kathryn M. Campbell, “Policy Responses to Wrongful Convictions in
Canada: The Role of Conviction Review, Public Inquiries, and Compensation” (2005) 41 Crim. L.
Bull. 145; Kent Roach, “The Role of Innocence Commissions: Error Discovery, Systemic Reform,
or Both?” (2010) 85 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 89; Peter de C. Cory, The Inquiry Regarding Thomas
Sophonow: The Investigation, Prosecution and Consideration of Entitlement to Compensation
(Winnipeg: Manitoba Justice, 2001) [hereinafter “Cory”]; Archibald Kaiser, “Wrongful Conviction
and Imprisonment: Towards an End to the Compensatory Obstacle Course” (1989) 9 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 96 [hereinafter “Kaiser”]; David Hamer, “Wrongful Convictions, Appeals, and the
Finality Principle: The Case for a Criminal Cases Review Commission” (2014) 37 U.N.S.W.L.J. 270
[hereinafter “Hamer”].
35
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breach that seriously infringed the right to disclosure, fair trial rights and
the ability to make full answer and defence[.]38

British Columbia argued that the tort of malicious prosecution provided
an adequate remedy and that it was not necessary to recognize an
additional cause of action in respect of Charter damages under section 24(1).
Somewhat ironically, one of the bases on which British Columbia
resisted Henry’s argument was the under-inclusiveness of the Charter
remedy.39 British Columbia also relied upon the proposition that most
nation states that have adopted compensation schemes for wrongful
conviction have adopted qualifying criteria that include demonstrable
factual innocence.40 In holding that policy considerations could prevent
the recovery of Charter damages and that factual innocence might
be relevant to the quantum of damages, Moldaver J. steered a course
between these positions.41 However, disputes about the proper role of
arguments about factual innocence predate Henry v. British Columbia,
and they have persisted in the wake of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision.
In 1988, the Federal-Provincial Ministers Responsible for Criminal
Justice adopted Guidelines on Compensation for Wrongfully Convicted
and Imprisoned Persons.42 These Guidelines provide that “compensation
should only be granted to persons who did not commit the crimes of
which they were convicted.”43 However, the Guidelines have never been
passed into legislation and Hinkson C.J.S.C. concluded that “most
contemporary compensation awards have departed in some respects
from” them.44 The Model Legislation promulgated by the U.S. Innocence
Project to govern claims for wrongful conviction also conditions
compensation on a showing of demonstrable innocence. Section 4.A.2 of
that Model Legislation provides that:
In order to obtain a judgment in his or her favor, claimant must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that:
.....
38
Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), Supreme Court of Canada file no. 35745,
factum of the appellant, at para. 5. See also para. 8.
39
Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), Supreme Court of Canada file no. 35745,
factum of the respondent, Attorney General of British Columbia, at paras. 106-108.
40
Id., at para. 112.
41
Supra, note 2, at para. 95.
42
Reproduced as Appendix A to Kaiser, supra, note 37, at 152-53.
43
Id., at 152, 153.
44
Henry 2016 BCSC, supra, note 3, at para. 376.
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2. Claimant did not commit any of the crimes charged in the
accusatory instrument … .45

A 2012 review of U.S. legislation that provided for compensation for the
wrongfully convicted concluded that 89 per cent of such statutes imposed
burdens of proving factual innocence (from “a preponderance of the
evidence” to “clear and convincing evidence”) on those who sought
compensation.46
When determining the quantum of Henry’s damages, Hinkson C.J.S.C.
held “I do not find foreign legislative schemes to be of assistance.”47
In describing the proper approach to quantum,48 Hinkson C.J.S.C. did not
analyze whether evidence of factual innocence is relevant. In particular, he
did not cite or expressly consider whether to apply Moldaver J.’s comment
that evidence of factual guilt or innocence may be relevant to quantum.49
Debra Parkes and I have recently supplied a review of the concept and
limits of wrongful convictions, with particular attention to the role of
demonstrable factual innocence.50 We argue that the emphasis on factual
innocence is partly attributable to the role of DNA exonerations in the
work of Innocence Projects. However, we also identify that certain
classes of criminal defendants — including women who are improperly
denied access to the defence of self-defence and those who are accused
of crimes that may never have occurred, such as infant death cases in
which causation is contested — may be less able to discharge a burden of
proving factual innocence.
The difficulties of proof that arise when factual innocence must be
established are also evident in the Henry case. I have already noted that
the British Columbia Court of Appeal declined to exonerate Henry.
Specifically, Low J.A. said that “it cannot be said that the Smallman
evidence … leads one to conclude that the appellant is innocent of the
offences for which he was convicted.”51 Vancouver Police failed to retain
physical evidence that had the potential to exonerate or implicate Henry,
45
Innocence Project, Making Up for Lost Time: What the Wrongfully Convicted Endure
and How to Provide Fair Compensation, Appendix B, online: <http://www.innocenceproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/innocence_project_compensation_report-6.pdf>.
46
Robert J. Norris, “Assessing Compensation Statutes for the Wrongly Convicted” (2012)
23:3 Criminal Justice Policy Review 352, at 364.
47
Henry 2016 BCSC, supra, note 3, at para. 412.
48
Id., at paras. 409-413, 445, 448 and 455.
49
Henry v. British Columbia, supra, note 2, at para. 95.
50
Debra Parkes & Emma Cunliffe, “Women and Wrongful Convictions: Concepts and
Challenges” (2015) 11:3 International Journal of Law in Context 219.
51
Henry 2010 BCCA, supra, note 9, at para. 151.
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McCrae or some third person in some or all of the offences with which
Henry was charged. The existence of this evidence was not disclosed to
Henry before, during or until long after his trial. Henry has emphasized
that this non-disclosure and destruction of evidence deprived him of an
opportunity to prove his innocence.52
Vancouver Sun columnist Ian Mulgrew, who believes that Henry is
innocent,53 was the only journalist who covered the civil trial on behalf
of the Vancouver Sun. Mulgrew argued that it was ignoble of the
defendants to assert that Henry may not be factually innocent.54 Henry’s
counsel, John Laxton, was reported as having said in court that if
Vancouver defended itself on the basis that Henry committed the
underlying offences, and failed in that defence, Henry would seek “a
very large award of punitive damages”.55 When Vancouver settled with
Henry, by the terms of that settlement it “unequivocally” withdrew “each
and every allegation made by it in its pleadings and in its opening
statement that Henry committed the crimes of which he was acquitted.”56
Notwithstanding the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s conclusion
that the Smallman evidence did not exonerate Henry, Henry relied
heavily on evidence of McCrae’s activities in his notice of claim.57 The
British Columbia Court of Appeal identified the legal consequences of
such evidence, had it been led at Henry’s trial:
… the Smallman material contains evidence of the propensity of
another suspect. If this evidence were admitted, it would open up the
possibility of the Crown leading reply evidence as to the circumstances
of certain criminal conduct by the appellant in Manitoba in 1976.
It would also possibly lead to the admissibility of an affidavit sworn by
52
Henry v. British Columbia, Fourth Amended Notice of Civil Claim, supra, note 9, at
paras. 15-17, 51(c), 52, 58, 62-64, 67-68, 88, 94-98, 102-103.
53
Ian Mulgrew, “26 years in jail for suspect convictions; Add a Vancouver man’s name to
the sadly growing list of wrongly convicted Canadians” Vancouver Sun (January 10, 2009), at A10.
54
For example: Ian Mulgrew, “Decades of wrongful imprisonment weigh heavily on Ivan
Henry: Suing for compensation” Vancouver Sun (July 19, 2014), at A8; Ian Mulgrew, “Ivan Henry case
shows government cannot be trusted; Call for change” Vancouver Sun (August 31, 2015), at A1.
55
Ian Mulgrew, “Ivan Henry under attack, again; Wrongful conviction” Vancouver Sun
(October 23, 2015), at A6.
56
Ian Mulgrew, “City settles with Ivan Henry for wrongful conviction; Ottawa and the
province ask for adjournment” Vancouver Sun (November 17, 2015), at A1.
57
Henry v. British Columbia, Fourth Amended Notice of Civil Claim, supra, note 9, at
paras. 18, 19, 20, 31, 34, 59, 64, 68, 97-100. Henry also points to the fact that certain police
activities, such as a wiretap, tracking device and fluorescent powder test, did not yield inculpatory
evidence, e.g., id., at paras. 32-39. Recognizing that physical evidence in the possession of the
Vancouver Police Department was destroyed, I presume that if other evidence of Henry’s factual
innocence existed or had been found, it would be identified in Henry’s notice of claim.
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the appellant in 2006 referencing a letter he wrote in 1994 in which he
admitted breaking into a house in Vancouver on 14 January 1982,
confronting a woman present and telling her that he “was looking for
someone who had ripped me off on a drug deal ...” but with no assault
ensuing.58

The convictions and letter referenced in this paragraph, along with a
1973 conviction for possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose,59
suggest that Henry’s criminal history included break, enter and assault
against women, carrying a weapon between the hours of 1:00 and 5:00 a.m.,
and using the “rip off” claim in the course of committing a break and
enter. Differences also arise: for example, most of these offences occurred
in Winnipeg rather than Vancouver and the weapon Henry carried in
1973 was a rifle rather than a knife. A closer analysis of similarities and
differences would, of course, require consideration of the proven facts
and underlying records. In a criminal trial, Henry’s claim that McCrae
committed the charged offences would likely lead to the admission of
this evidence of Henry’s past acts.60 However, such admission would be
accompanied by a judicial warning about the proper use of this evidence.
By observing that Henry’s factual innocence is not manifest, I do not
intend to minimize the wrongs perpetuated by State actors in this case.
If one cleaves (as I do) to the view that Charter rights have inherent value,
one must accept the correlate that any person is entitled to the protection of
those rights, regardless of factual innocence. As Susan Bandes has argued:
The notion of fair process, as distinguished from the notion of fair
results in particular cases, is always a hard sell. The notion of process is
abstract, complex, and not very media friendly. The notion that a
process needed to protect the innocent will unavoidably protect the
guilty on occasion is a sophisticated notion. An even harder sell is the
idea that all suspects ... should receive fair process, not just as a
windfall but because our constitutional protections are not meant to
protect only the innocent.61
58
Henry 2010 BCCA, supra, note 9, at para. 150. For further information about the 1976
charges, see R. v. Henry, [1977] M.J. No. 52 (Man. C.A.). A lengthy extract from the 1994 letter
written by Henry is reproduced by McEwen, supra, note 12, at 159.
59
R. v. Henry, [1973] M.J. No. 173, at para. 7 (Man. Co. Ct.).
60
See Sidney N. Lederman et al., The Law of Evidence in Canada, 4th ed. (Markham, ON:
LexisNexis Canada, 2014), at 10.104-10.109; R. v. McMillan, [1977] S.C.J. No. 32, [1977] 2 S.C.R.
824 (S.C.C.), affg [1975] O.J. No. 2247, 7 O.R. (2d) 750 (Ont. C.A.).
61
Susan Bandes, “Framing Wrongful Convictions” (2008) 1 Utah L. Rev. 5, at 16. See also
Hamer, supra, note 37, at 274: “it would be counterproductive to deny that convictions of the legally
innocent are also wrongful”.
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On this conception, it is possible to see Henry as ill-treated and the
process of investigating and convicting him as deeply flawed, while
reserving judgment about the question of underlying factual innocence.
Mulgrew’s columns in the Vancouver Sun and the Henry legal team’s
reported strategy of responding with indignation whenever the question
of guilt or innocence is raised resists the distinction that Bandes draws
between process rights and underlying criminal responsibility. Justice
Moldaver was seemingly seeking to avoid this type of conflation when
he held in Henry v. British Columbia that proof of causation did not
depend on a showing of factual innocence.62
As the Henry civil trial proceeded in the British Columbia Supreme
Court, the question of factual innocence became more complicated.
In a ruling issued early in the trial, Hinkson C.J.S.C. held that several
paragraphs of the 2010 British Columbia Court of Appeal decision “are
findings that were necessarily determined in the proceedings in
that Court and are binding on both the plaintiff and the Province as
between them”.63 The enumerated paragraphs relate to the adequacy of
identification evidence, the admission of the photograph of the line-up,
the adequacy of the trial judge’s instructions, and the manner in which
the pre-trial identification procedure tainted the identification evidence.
In Toronto (City) v. CUPE, Local 79, the Supreme Court of Canada
held:
Properly understood and applied, the doctrines of res judicata and
abuse of process govern the interplay between different judicial
decision makers. These rules and principles call for a judicial balance
between finality, fairness, efficiency and authority of judicial decisions.64

Toronto v. CUPE focused on the question of whether a person convicted
of sexual assault and dismissed from his employment as a result could
have his employment reinstated by an arbitrator on the basis that the
sexual assault did not occur. Justice Arbour held on behalf of the

62
Supra, note 2, at para. 95. See also Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Police Services Board,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 41, 2007 SCC 41 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin C.J.C., at para. 64 and Charron J.
(dissenting), at paras. 156-161, affg [2005] O.J. No. 4045 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Hill v. HamiltonWentworth”].
63
Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2015] B.C.J. No. 2141, 2015 BCSC
1798, at para. 16 (B.C.S.C.).
64
Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), Local 79, [2003] S.C.J.
No. 64, 2003 SCC 63, at para. 15 (S.C.C.), affg [2001] O.J. No. 3239 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter
“Toronto v. CUPE”].
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majority that permitting relitigation of a question that had been
conclusively determined by a criminal court would constitute an abuse of
process. She concluded that this principle would hold whether the party
is a plaintiff or defendant in the subsequent civil proceeding.65 While
recognizing a general rule against relitigation, she held that in certain
circumstances relitigation may enhance the credibility and effectiveness
of the justice system. These circumstances included “when fairness
dictates that the result should not be binding in the new context”.66 The
question therefore arises whether the principles identified by Arbour J.
hold when the criminal court has acquitted a defendant.
In her dissenting reasons in Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth, Charron J.
identified the challenges that arise when the shift is made from criminal
acquittal to civil trial:
It is a principle of fundamental justice that the accused in a criminal
trial be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Therefore, from a
criminal law perspective, there is no question that an acquittal must be
regarded as tantamount to a finding of innocence. However, in the
context of a tort action, we must come to terms with the reality that the
person who committed the offence may well stand to benefit rather than
lose from a botched-up investigation. The true victim in such cases is
not the suspect but the public at large. Should the successful accused
who actually committed the offence be entitled to use the acquittal
brought about by the negligent conduct of police investigators as a
basis to claim compensation?67

Justice Charron proceeds to offer the example of a victim of a brutal
sexual assault who offers a firm identification in circumstances in which
the police fail to follow the correct identification procedure. The accused
is properly acquitted because the frailties inherent to eyewitness evidence
mean that there must be a reasonable doubt. Justice Charron then
contemplates a civil case in which the accused — now the plaintiff —
sues in tort:
How is the civil claim to be adjudicated? Is the acquittal to be
considered as the legal equivalent of factual innocence in the civil trial
thereby precluding the defendant from [defending itself on the basis
that the accused in fact committed the underlying crime]? … [I]f he is
in fact the assailant, many would view it as unthinkable that his loss
65
66
67

Id., at para. 49.
Id., at para. 52.
Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth, supra, note 62, at para. 161.
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should be regarded as compensable at law, given that the true victim
who was harmed as a result of the police officer’s substandard conduct
was society, not the plaintiff.68

Justice Charron also identifies that placing a burden on an acquitted
defendant to prove factual innocence could also be unjust: “Meeting this
burden may prove impossible to do. … It would also necessitate a retrial
of the case which may well lead to conflicting findings and put an aura of
suspicion on his acquittal.”69 The majority declined to decide whether an
acquittal should be treated as conclusive proof of innocence, but noted
that in the United States, a victim may recover damages against an
accused who has been acquitted at criminal trial.70
Chief Justice Hinkson’s reasons regarding issue estoppel do not
expressly consider whether principles developed in the context of
challenging a criminal conviction apply with equal force to the context in
which a criminal defendant has been acquitted after a lengthy period of
imprisonment.71 However, based on the discussion in Hill v. HamiltonWentworth, it seems at least arguable that the burdens and standards of
proof play out differently in this context.
In his decision awarding Charter damages, Hinkson C.J.S.C. did not
reach any conclusion regarding Henry’s underlying guilt or innocence.
Having reviewed the information that was not disclosed by Crown
counsel, he identified that the failure to disclose material information
was compounded by four disclosure-related “inappropriate acts”
committed by Crown counsel at trial.72 Chief Justice Hinkson concluded:
… if Crown Counsel had provided Mr. Henry with the documents in
their control to which he was entitled, and refrained from the four
inappropriate acts discussed above, that on the balance of probabilities,
Mr. Henry would not have been convicted of the various counts of
which he was convicted on March 15, 1983.73

It is not clear from Hinkson C.J.S.C.’s reasons whether he considers that
evidence of factual innocence or guilt might be relevant to quantum in a
different case.
68

Id., at para. 165.
Id., at para. 166.
70
Id., at para. 64.
71
Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2015] B.C.J. No. 2141, 2015 BCSC 1798,
at paras. 17-21 (B.C.S.C.).
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Henry 2016 BCSC, supra, note 3, at paras. 266-273.
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Id., at para. 274.
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In Part VI, I will briefly return to the role of demonstrable innocence
in post-conviction review processes. First, however, I wish to consider
how the British Columbia Supreme Court engaged with the interests of
the trial complainants throughout the course of Henry v. British
Columbia.

V. PROTECTING THE COMPLAINANTS
There is no question that eight trial complainants, together with a
larger number of complainants who testified at Henry’s preliminary
hearing, were sexually assaulted in terrifying circumstances. The seven
trial complainants who testified at Henry’s trial suffered the further
ordeal of being cross-examined by an accused who was subsequently
diagnosed with serious mental illness, whose behaviour was “peculiar”,
and who denied that they had been assaulted. When declaring Henry to
be a dangerous offender, Bouck J. observed:
… I cannot let this aspect of the case pass by without commenting upon
the courage of the complainants when they came forward and related
their horrifying experiences. …
It is devastating enough to be assaulted as they were, but it must be
equally repulsive for them to endure cross-examination at trial and on
this application by the very individual who committed these deplorable
acts. They are to be commended for seeing the matter through to the
bitter end notwithstanding their obvious wish to try and forget it all and
begin their lives anew.
.....
… At one point in these proceedings, he taunted one of the complainants
with belittling words when he was trying to cross-examine her at the
hearing.74

In 2010, when he concluded that the procedures used by police undermined
the reliability of the trial complainants’ identification evidence, Low J.A.
did not impugn the trial complainants’ honesty.75
After Henry had filed his civil claim, two of the complainants asked
the British Columbia Supreme Court to take steps to protect their privacy
and safety during the anticipated case. They requested anonymity
because, in the words of one complainant “I have specific concerns for
74
75

Supra, note 5, at paras. 10, 11, 13.
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my safety.”76 The complainants explained that they and several others
had been contacted by author and lawyer Joan McEwen (who was
writing a book about Henry) and that an investigator had used trap and
trace methods77 to find them. They had not been advised of McEwen’s
application for access to the Henry trial record, nor of a hearing called on
a motion to relax the express undertaking imposed on Henry as a
condition of access to documents that concerned them and their fellow
complainants. They also told Goepel J. that one of the complainants had
received “what was considered a threatening letter” from Henry,
addressed to her at her parents’ house.78
The first complainant explained:
We are well aware it is … not advisable to appear without the benefit
of legal counsel, but we find ourselves in a difficult position as the
Attorney General who represented our interests in the criminal trial is
the defendant in this case, and as such cannot offer us advice or
direction in these complex legal matters. 79

The complainant identified that she and her co-complainants felt they
were in need of legal representation, and that a court ruling to relax the
undertaking would “affect a great number of women who need and
deserve protection.”80 The second complainant explained that the “proposed
publication ban and sealing of documents has not prevented others from
accessing our names and using other means to locate us.”81 An affidavit
sworn by a victim services worker identified that all of the complainants
were suffering from symptoms of trauma that impacted significantly on
their lives and health.82
Justice Goepel expressed sympathy for the complainants’ concerns,
and identified the extent to which the complainants were necessarily
involved in the trial ahead:

76

Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), Vancouver registry no. S114405,
transcript of proceedings in Chambers, November 21, 2012, at 83 (B.C.S.C.).
77
The trap and trace method of locating a person entails using a pretext to prompt the
person of interest to call a given number, then ascertaining that person’s physical location from data
associated with the telephone or cell phone used by the person of interest.
78
Supra, note 76, at 85. The complainant also made reference to a quote attributed to Henry
in Joan McEwen, “The Innocence Project” Vancouver Magazine (October 2012), online:
<http://vanmag.com/city/the-innocence-project/>.
79
Id., at 85.
80
Id., at 86.
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Id., at 86-87.
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Id., at 58.

160

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d)

I have tremendous sympathy for the position you find yourselves in
today, having gone through what you undoubtedly went through such a
long time ago[.] … [I]f a miscarriage of justice took place in this
matter, and it took place because of the acts, perhaps, of the police
department or the prosecutors, as has been alleged … you are, by
necessity, caught up in this matter, and things and statements that you
may have given so long ago may, unfortunately, be matters which are
going to … have to come before me. 83

Justice Goepel also voiced concerns about whether counsel for the British
Columbia Attorney General could or should represent the complainants in
its work in the civil trial:
I’m concerned that you’re forced to be wearing two hats … the legal
complications of the question of [the complainants’] privacy rights, and
the importance of it, I suspect that it would be most difficult for the
complainants in their personal capacities to frame the legal issues —
I appreciate the personal issues. … [T]heir legal position, though, is
one of extreme complexity. They are caught up in a proceeding … in
which we have their rights, which are very important rights, being dealt
with. … I’m concerned that these very important privacy rights, that
you’re not in a position to argue. You’ve got two – you’re wearing too
many hats at this point in time.84

Notwithstanding these observations, the Attorney General declined to
fund independent legal counsel for the complainants. Ultimately, Goepel J.
relaxed the implicit undertaking as Henry requested. However, he ruled
that no counsel could share addresses of the complainants (other than
addresses at which the assaults occurred) with his or her client except
with the prior consent of the Attorney General. Justice Goepel observed
in his reasons that “[f]or the victims of sexual assault to have to relive
those events after more than 30 years is an almost unimaginable horror.
It cannot, however, in this case, be avoided. It is a necessary by-product
of the allegations made in this proceeding.”85
While Goepel J. clearly accepted that the complainants’ Charter rights
were implicated in Henry’s civil trial, Hinkson C.J.S.C. issued a decision
in late 2015 that denied that proposition without providing analysis:
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The applicant [Vancouver Rape Relief] contends that because the
plaintiff is seeking damages pursuant to the Charter, his case is a public
law case, involving the Charter rights of the 1980’s complainants. In
my view, the Charter rights of the 1980’s complainants are not engaged
in these proceedings.86

Which of these characterizations is correct? Henry’s claim against British
Columbia included a claim for damages for breach of Henry’s Charter
rights before, during and after his trial for sexual offences. The impugned
rights include the right to disclosure, full answer and defence, liberty and
security of the person. The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly
emphasized that the “principles of fundamental justice reflect a spectrum
of interests, from the rights of the accused to broader societal concerns”.87
In particular, society has legitimate interests in encouraging sexual
assault victims to report crime and protecting witnesses’ privacy. “[F]ailure
to consider the position of the complainant in the trial process may have
the opposite effect.”88
In R. v. Mills, the Supreme Court of Canada drew a direct connection
between an accused person’s Charter right to disclosure and the Charter
rights of sexual assault complainants, emphasizing the relationship
between privacy, equality and dignity. The majority held:
In this respect, an appreciation of myths and stereotypes in the context
of sexual violence is essential to delineate properly the boundaries of
full answer and defence. As we have already discussed, the right to
make full answer and defence does not include the right to information
that would only distort the truth-seeking goal of the trial process. 89

In R. v. Osolin, Cory J. held on behalf of a majority that “A complainant
should not be unduly harassed and pilloried to the extent of becoming a
victim of an insensitive judicial system.”90 In R. v. O’Connor, a case that
also considers the right to production of records, all judges agreed that
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complainants have a constitutional right to privacy. Justice L’HeureuxDubé observed:
Equally relevant, for our purposes, is Lamer J.’s recognition91 … that
the right to security of the person encompasses the right to be protected
against psychological trauma. In the context of his discussion of the
effects on an individual of unreasonable delay contrary to s. 11(b) of
the Charter, he noted that such trauma could take the form of
stigmatization of the accused, loss of privacy, stress and anxiety
resulting from a multitude of factors, including possible disruption of
family, social life and work, legal costs, uncertainty as to the outcome
and sanction.
If the word “complainant” were substituted for the word “accused” in
the above extract, I think that we would have an excellent description
of the psychological traumas potentially faced by sexual assault
complainants.92

The complainants’ submissions to Goepel J. demonstrate the adverse
impact of the Henry case on the complainants’ privacy and security of
the person.
When the case came before the Supreme Court of Canada, several
complainants sought leave to intervene in order to make submissions
about how the Court should have regard to the Charter rights of sexual
assault complainants in assessing a claim for Charter damages for nondisclosure in this context.93 In making this argument, the complainants
relied on R. v. Mills94 and on the statement in Vancouver (City) v. Ward
that the section 24(1) Charter damages remedy must be developed with
careful regard to the existing balance of interests and policy
considerations.95 Justice Karakatsanis denied the application to intervene
on the basis that “it would not be appropriate to allow these applicants,
who are potential participants in the underlying proceedings, to be
involved in this appeal.”96 Justice Goepel’s concerns about which parties
91
In R. v. Mills, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, at 920 (S.C.C.), affg [1983] O.J.
No. 3311 (Ont. C.A.).
92
R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at 483 (S.C.C.), affg [1994]
B.C.J. No. 702 (B.C.C.A.).
93
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were in a position to protect the Charter rights of the complainants are
arguably substantiated by the fact that no other party or intervener made
the arguments that had been offered by the complainants.
Over the course of the civil trial, the complainants’ concerns about the
extent to which the court and the parties will protect their privacy and
dignity have been realized. An object lesson is offered by the Vancouver
Sun’s coverage of the case — and particularly its characterization of the
role of trial complainant JF — and the Court’s failure to supervise that
reporting. Ian Mulgrew describes JF as “the real catalyst behind the
miscarriage of justice” and “the only reason Henry was charged”. He has
quoted a police description of her as “very attractive” and reproduced in
full a letter sent by JF to a police officer, while describing that letter as
“veritably tear stained”.97 He has identified JF’s geographic location and
named a friend of JF’s.
It seems highly likely that Mulgrew supplied enough information for
some readers to identify JF. To the best of my knowledge, neither
the lawyers nor Hinkson C.J.S.C. has raised the question of whether the
Vancouver Sun’s reporting was fair and accurate, nor considered the
impact of such characterizations (in and out of court) on the Charter
rights of the complainants in this case and on the willingness of other
women to report sexual assault. JF was scheduled to testify in Henry’s
trial on the day that Vancouver announced its settlement with Henry. As a
result of the fact and timing of that settlement, she was deprived of the
opportunity to respond to claims made inside the courtroom and in the
media about her role in Henry’s wrongful conviction.
It is in this context that Vancouver Rape Relief applied in November
2015 for standing to bring an application for the appointment of amicus
curiae in the Henry trial. Vancouver Rape Relief argued that amicus
curiae was necessary to make submissions on the proper approach to
factual innocence and to protect the Charter rights of the complainants.
Recall that the Supreme Court of Canada had denied the complainants
standing to intervene because their role in the case disqualified them. In
light of this prior decision, it is ironic that Hinkson C.J.S.C. denied
Vancouver Rape Relief standing on the basis that notwithstanding its
lengthy history of assisting and advocating on behalf of sexual assault
complainants, it had “no stake in these proceedings, nor does it purport to
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Ian Mulgrew, “Ivan Henry’s accuser to testify, finally” Vancouver Sun (November 15,
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represent any of the 1980’s complainants”.98 Furthermore, evidently
overlooking the fact that this is the first case in which a plaintiff has
sought Charter damages for wrongful conviction, Hinkson C.J.S.C. noted
that Vancouver Rape Relief’s “work does not normally include
intervention in claims for Charter damages by those who assert that they
have been wrongfully convicted of a criminal offence”.99
Justice Karakatsanis’s decision to deny the complainants standing and
Hinkson C.J.S.C.’s decision to deny standing to Vancouver Rape Relief
leads me to think that the courts’ approach to hearing from those who
would represent the interests of sexual assault complainants is at best like
that of Goldilocks to eating porridge — but with only two bowls, neither
of which is “just right”. Unfortunately, in the result, no party or lawyer
was tasked with ensuring that the complainants’ Charter rights and
interests were considered while assessing the Crown’s duty to make
disclosure circa 1983 or in crafting a just approach to quantifying Charter
damages for wrongful conviction. These rights and interests were not
actively safeguarded within the court process and media reporting about
the trial.
Chief Justice Hinkson’s final decision engaged at considerable length
with the complainants’ statements and their testimony at trial.100 In his
decision, Hinkson C.J.S.C. concluded that there were “many inconsistencies
in the undisclosed evidence relating to each of the complainants” that “had
the potential to seriously undermine the identifications they made”.101
Because of the Crown’s non-disclosure, Henry was deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the complainants about these matters during
his 1983 trial.
Most of the inconsistencies identified by Hinkson C.J.S.C. relate to the
complainants’ description of their attackers’ voice and appearance. Some
seem to have substantial probative value.102 Other matters characterized by
Hinkson C.J.S.C. as inconsistencies seem rather semantic.103 Overall,
Hinkson C.J.S.C.’s reasons leave the impression that many or all of the
complainants were unreliable, or that their testimony was incautious. Had
the complainants been witnesses in the civil trial, the rule in Browne v.
Dunn would require that these matters be put to them, and that they be
98
99
100
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102
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invited to explain any apparent contradictions.104 However, because no
party called the complainants to testify, the complainants were not afforded
this right to respond to criticisms of them.
Chief Justice Hinkson’s reasons do not consider whether the
complainants’ exclusion from the civil trial left gaps in the factual record
before him. Crown counsel Michael Luchenko died before the civil trial
commenced, and accordingly did not give evidence regarding his work
on the Henry prosecution. Within the damages decision, Luchenko
shoulders much of the blame.105 Chief Justice Hinkson’s reasoning offers
a straightforward narrative of a wrongful conviction being caused by a
Crown lawyer acting in a manner that was improper when judged by the
standards of the day, aided by a group of untrustworthy sexual assault
complainants. When one compares these reasons against those offered by
the British Columbia Court of Appeal in 2010 when it acquitted Henry
and against the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2015 decision, one is left
with the impression that the “story” of the Henry case and the array of
material issues is almost endlessly malleable. One common thread
throughout these judicial processes, however, is that the complainants
have never been given an opportunity to share their perspectives on the
police investigation and trial process.

VI. CONCLUSION
In conducting the research that forms the basis for this article,
I learned that Henry’s trial proceeded while Thomas Sophonow was
enduring the second of his three trials for the murder of Barbara Stoppel.
That case also famously resulted in a wrongful conviction, and a lengthy
inquiry conducted by retired Supreme Court of Canada Justice Peter
Cory.106 Justice Cory’s report explores, among other salient issues, the
role of police tunnel vision, the frailties of eyewitness identification
evidence, disclosure obligations, alibi evidence, and the proper basis on
104

Browne v. Dunn (1893), 6 R. 67.
For example Henry 2016 BCSC, supra, note 3, at paras. 115-118, 122-184, 191-229,
242-246, 258, 266, 274. Compare Re Truscott, [2007] O.J. No. 3221, 2007 ONCA 575 at para. 117
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which compensation should be awarded to a wrongly convicted person
who has spent a lengthy period in prison.
Justice Cory recommended the establishment of an independent postconviction review entity along the lines of the U.K. Criminal Cases
Review Commission. He concluded that his approach to recommending
compensation for Sophonow should be informed by Sophonow’s
demonstrable innocence.107 Justice Cory’s report also considers the harm
done to Stoppel’s family by Sophonow’s wrongful conviction. He
recommended that Manitoba compensate the Stoppel family “for the pain
and suffering that has been occasioned to the family by the wrongful
conviction and imprisonment of Thomas Sophonow”.108
The Sophonow case differs from Henry. Sophonow was able to
demonstrate his factual innocence, thereby relieving Cory J. of the
difficult task of deciding whether and where to place the burden of
demonstrating underlying factual guilt or innocence, and with what
consequences for quantum. Sophonow’s time in prison was much shorter
than Henry’s. However, perhaps most importantly, Sophonow’s entitlement
to compensation was adjudicated through an Inquiry process that was
sufficiently flexible to attend to the systemic causes of wrongful
conviction as well as the particular effects of this wrongful conviction on
Sophonow and on the victim’s family.
The evolution of Henry v. British Columbia as a civil claim for Charter
damages both narrowed and distorted the range of interests to which the
Court had regard in determining just compensation. Ultimately, Hinkson
C.J.S.C. rejected the proposition that Henry is a public law case. In his
ruling denying standing to Vancouver Rape Relief, he characterized the
case as “private litigation between the two remaining parties, albeit one a
government actor”.109
In this article, I have traced the ways in which the narrowing and
distortion of issues over the passage of the Henry case diverted the
Court’s attention from some important questions. Before Hinkson
C.J.S.C., the question of factual innocence appears to have been
transformed from a difficult, but potentially relevant, consideration in
assessing quantum to an irrelevant and perhaps assumed fact. This
transformation seemingly happened without careful attention to the
107
Id., “Compensation: Entitlement Principles Based on Factual Innocence” and
“Compensation: Should there be a Cap Placed on the Damages Flowing from Wrongful Conviction
and Imprisonment”.
108
Id., “Compensation: Consideration of the Stoppel Family”.
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relationship between criminal responsibility and constitutional rights.
Even more concerning, as the Henry case evolved, attempts to pay
attention to the Charter rights and interests of the complainants were
completely sidelined. The fears that the complainants expressed about
their safety and dignity and about the adverse effects of public attention
largely went unheard. In Hinkson C.J.S.C.’s decision, the complainants
are depicted as untrustworthy witnesses, despite the fact that they were
not given the usual opportunity to respond to such characterization.
Reconstructed as private litigation, the Henry trial ultimately denied
the complex and multidimensional approach to Charter rights that is
contemplated by cases such as Mills and O’Connor. The evolution of this
trial process demonstrates the extent to which an adversarial trial model
predicated on an antagonistic relationship between a self-interested state
party (which was conceived by the trial judge as an essentially private
actor) and a self-interested individual plaintiff permitted both state and
court to abdicate their responsibility to protect sexual assault complainants’
privacy and dignity. The course of the Henry case also illustrates the
inadequacies of Canada’s ad hoc approach to reviewing and determining
compensation for wrongful convictions. The Sophonow Inquiry
demonstrates that, with good terms of reference and sensitive leadership,
it is possible for an inquisitorial process to avoid the either/or choices
that the Henry Court perceived itself to face. The wrongly convicted,
sexual assault complainants and the Canadian public deserve better from
the process of reviewing a wrongful conviction.

